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CASE AND COMMENT
collateral challenge defended or no smoke without fine
The imposition of a £10 Wne for violating a no-smoking ban on a train
to Brighton is an unlikely start for a decision of major constitutional
importance—even when the incendiary incident occurred, as here, on
5 November. Nevertheless, Boddington v. British Transport Police [1998]
2 W.L.R. 639 has provided the House of Lords with the opportunity
to deliver a strong aYrmation of a defendant's right to raise the validity
of the administrative action which has resulted in his prosecution as a
defence in criminal proceedings.
After a long campaign of civil disobedience, Peter Boddington was
charged with smoking a cigarette on a Network South Central train in
violation of byelaw 20 of the Railways Byelaws 1965. Boddington did
not deny the facts alleged but sought to challenge the validity of the
byelaw and the decision of the railway company to implement it on all
carriages by way of defence. He was convicted by the stipendiary
magistrate and the Divisional Court dismissed his appeal, holding that
the defence of invalidity was not available in criminal proceedings and
that any challenge had to be brought by means of judicial review.
The existing doctrine on the availability of collateral challenge in
criminal proceedings was confused and exhibited the particular tension
which underlies much public law litigation. If, as O'Reilly v. Mackman
[1983] 2 A.C. 237 suggests, the protections aVorded public bodies by
the judicial review procedure are necessary in the interests of legal
certainty, the prospect of administrative action being set aside in
enforcement proceedings which may occur some years later is a
disturbing one. On the other hand, the notion that a court should hold
against the defendant (and perhaps impose a term of imprisonment)
when the legal basis of the public body's action is questionable raises
very real concerns for the rule of law and individual justice.
429
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The former considerations, compounded by fears of inconsistency
between diVerent benches of magistrates in distinct parts of the country,
persuaded the Divisional Court in the present case to extend a principle
announced by its predecessor in Bugg v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[1993] Q.B. 473. Bugg decided that although a defendant should be
permitted to raise the substantive invalidity of a byelaw as a defence
on a criminal charge, judicial review provides an exclusive remedy where
the alleged Xaw is procedural (such as a failure to consult).
The House of Lords was unimpressed by the attempt to impose a
rigid dichotomy on the available grounds of challenge where the
distinction between procedure and substance possessed no compelling
justiWcation and was likely to prove extremely diYcult to apply in
practice. The House therefore overruled Bugg and held that it was a
matter of constitutional principle that a defendant should be able to
impugn the validity of the acts of public authorities by way of defence
in criminal proceedings on all relevant grounds (although, on the facts,
Boddington's challenge failed). The House did not, however, go so far
as to hold that collateral challenge would always be available: the
question in every case would require the construction of the speciWc
statutory context. This proviso was necessary to accommo-
date the House's own recent decision in R. v. Wicks [1998] A.C. 92 in
which it held that where Parliament had provided a complex system of
appeals and where the decision was one addressed speciWcally to the
defendant, exercise of the right of appeal and judicial review might
provide exclusive modes of challenge.
It follows that administrative action which is unlawful, as with a
byelaw which is ultra vires, must be void. Any other conclusion would
make a nonsense of the defence. Unless the public authority's action is
declared retroactively to be a nullity, even a successful collateral
challenge would not avail the defendant as the conduct giving rise to
the prosecution necessarily predates the legal proceedings in which the
defence is raised. However, the House did not speak with one voice on
a related issue which has assumed some importance in recent years.
This concerns the eVect of the decision or norm before it is set aside
and, in particular, whether others may invoke their belief in its validity
as a defence when proceedings are brought against them. The situation
arose most famously in a successor case to Bugg in which one of those
arrested for violation of the byelaw there held to be invalid sought
compensation for wrongful arrest. The Court of Appeal rejected the
claim in Percy v. Hall [1997] Q.B. 924 and Lord Steyn in the present
case appears to regard this result as correct. The Lord Chancellor
disagreed and adopted the logically purer view that if the action was
void, it was incapable of producing any legally valid consequences.
Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Slynn of Hadley explicitly left the
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question open and Lord HoVmann unhelpfully agreed with both Lord
Irvine of Lairg and Lord Steyn. However, the House is unlikely to be
able to avoid the issue for long as the Court of Appeal recently decided
in R. v. Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Brockhill, ex p. Evans (No. 2)
[1998] T.L.R. 416 that proceedings in the tort of false imprisonment
may be brought against a prison governor where the decision to
authorise the continued detention of a prisoner was invalid.
This disagreement on the eVects of invalidity should not detract
from the unanimity of the House's general approach to collateral
challenge nor from the importance of this decision for individual
defendants and those interested in the principled development of
public law.
Ivan Hare
election spending and freedom of expression
With the imminent incorporation of the European Convention on
Human Rights and the recent publication of the Report of the Neill
Committee on Standards in Public Life (Cm 4057), these are exciting,
if Xuid, times for those with an interest in party political funding. In
tandem these initiatives will begin the long overdue process of reform
to the law and practice of elections in the UK. A key diYculty
awaiting the new regime is one long familiar to many other Western
democracies, namely how to regulate election spending whilst
preserving the integrity of an entrenched right to freedom of
expression, a question recently considered by the European Court of
Human Rights in Bowman v. UK (141/1996/762/959).
In the run up to the 1992 General Election, the Society for the
Protection of the Unborn Child and its executive director, Phyllis
1Bowman, printed and distributed 1 million leaXets nationally,2
including 25,000 in Halifax, detailing the position on abortion of
each of the major candidates in that constituency. The leaXets
described the Labour candidate as a ªleading pro-abortionistº and
her Conservative opponent as having a ªWrm commitment to
defending the unborn childº. Mrs. Bowman was subsequently charged
under section 75(5) of the Representation of the People Act 1983.
This Act governs electoral law in the UK and whilst it places no
limit on electoral expenditure at a national campaign level (see R. v.
Tronoh Mines [1952] 1 All E.R. 697), constituency expenditure is
subject to stringent limits. Section 76 limits the expenditure of each
candidate to about £8,300 with all expenditure being channelled
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through a candidate's election agent, who submits an account after
the election.
Circumvention of this rule by third party expenditure is prohibited
by section 75(l) which requires that ªNo expenses shall, with a view
to promoting or procuring the election of a candidate at an election,
be incurred by any person other than the candidate [and] his election
agent . . . [save that this restriction does not] apply to any expenses
not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of £5º. Following DPP v.
Luft [1977] A.C. 962, negative campaigning is deemed to fall within
the ambit of this section. The case against Mrs. Bowman was that
the cost of the Halifax campaign exceeded the prescribed £5
expenditure limit. Owing to the summons being issued out of time,
the prosecution against her failed. Nevertheless she applied to the
European Commission of Human Rights claiming that her
prosecution under section 75(5) was an unjustiWable restriction on
her rights under Article 10, which protects freedom of expression,
but permits restrictions on a number of grounds. The Commission
agreed and referred the case to the Court.
The key issues for the Court were whether the restrictions
(a) pursued a legitimate aim and (b) were necessary in a democratic
society. As to the Wrst, the Court accepted the Government's
submission that the expenditure ceiling sought to secure equality of
participation between candidates. Preventing third parties (especially
wealthy ones) from campaigning for or against particular candidates,
and thereby potentially distorting political debate, promoted fairness.
Accordingly, section 75(1) pursued the legitimate aim of protecting
the rights of others, both candidates and electors. As to necessity,
reading Article 10 together with Article 3 of the First Protocol, the
Court noted that ªfree elections and freedom of expression,
particularly freedom of political debate, together form the bedrock of
any democratic systemº. Whilst these elements are ordinarily mutually
sustaining, they could, and in the instant case did, conXict. Although
Contracting States have a margin of appreciation in managing this
conXict, the Court was impressed by the applicant's submission that
the £5 limit was disproportionate and illogical, given that no
restrictions applied to the media and national expenditure is
eVectively unlimited. In practice the restriction served as a complete
barrier to Mrs. Bowman's publishing information with a view to
inXuencing the electorate of Halifax in favour of an anti-abortion
candidate. The Court was not satisWed that it was necessary to limit
third party expenditure to £5 in order to secure the valid end of
candidate equality and held that section 75 violated Article 10.
Such reasoning is welcome in that it balances Article 10 against
Parliament's aim of imposing expenditure ceilings to promote
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electoral fairness. This approach is to be distinguished from the
absolutist stance of the Supreme Court in a series of campaign
Wnancing cases, typiWed by the landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo
424 U.S. 1 (1976) which held at pp. 48–49 that ªthe concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voices of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendmentº. By Wnding UK law to be inconsistent with
the Convention on the basis of proportionality, the Court accepted
that whilst money may well be speech, expenditure limits are not per
se an objectionable fetter on freedom of expression. In this way, the
Strasbourg court is travelling along similar lines to that of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the important case of Libman v. Quebec
(Attorney General) 151 D.L.R. (4th) 385. In both cases the tribunals
emphasised the importance of equality in electoral matters, a
consideration that has ceased to trouble the US Supreme Court.
Less satisfactory are the practical implications of the decision.
The Court's reasoning suggests it would not object to a (say) £500
limit on the basis of proportionality. Although this extension does
not obviously compromise the principle of electoral equality, it does
create the opportunity for like-minded persons to ªpoolº resources
against particular candidates and thereby skew the balance of debate.
As average candidate spending limits are currently around £8,300,
only a modest number of individuals need to pool for such an
impact. The eVect of large groups ªsplinteringº would be the same.
This diYculty was noted in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General),
which recognised the need to limit expenditure to low levels and
prevent third parties from pooling their spending as a means of
achieving fairness and equality in elections. It is however not certain
that even the most detailed membership registration regulations can
counter determined attempts to ªpoolº and ªsplinterº. Accordingly,
raising expenditure limits from the de minimis level of £5 may have
the unintended eVect of undermining expenditure ceilings and, as
noted in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General) at p. 413, ªthe
spending limit system would lose all its eVectiveness if independent
spending were not also limitedº.
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh
the lockerbie case continues
The background to the Cases concerning Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1998
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I.C.J. Rep. is well known; in 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up
over Scotland and 270 people were killed. The USA and the UK
accused two Libyans of the bombing and sought their extradition.
Libya argued on the basis of the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
that it was not bound to extradite its own nationals but could try
them in its own courts, if appropriate. Libya took the cases to the
International Court of Justice. It failed in its requests for provisional
measures (see Lowe, (1992) 51 C.L.J. 408), but continued with its
claims that the USA and the UK should respect its rights under the
Montreal Convention and not put pressure on it to surrender
the accused. The respondents made preliminary objections to the
jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the application.
Their main line of argument was that this was not a matter for
the Court because the Security Council had dealt with the issue by
passing Resolutions 731, 748 and 833. The USA and UK claimed
that these Resolutions required Libya to surrender the two accused
and also to demonstrate its renunciation of support for terrorism. As
Resolutions 748 and 833 were made under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, they were binding and overrode the provisions of the
Montreal Convention; there was therefore no longer any dispute
between the parties under the Montreal Convention.
Libya argued that the Security Council Resolutions did not in
fact require surrender of the accused, but that if they did they were
ultra vires. The determination by the Security Council in Resolution
748 that ªthe failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its
continued failure to respond fully and eVectively to the requests in
Resolution 731 (1992) constitute a threat to international peace and
securityº was not justiWed. There was no threat to international peace
and security and therefore the Security Council was acting ultra vires.
The Court gave two separate judgments, but the reasoning and
the operative parts of the judgments were essentially the same and
they will be discussed together in this note. (Indeed, the identity of
interest between the USA and UK made it somewhat surprising that
the UK was allowed an ad hoc judge.) The Court gave a brief and
rather technical judgment carefully avoiding the fundamental issue
underlying the arguments of the parties, that of the power of the
Court to allow judicial review of the decisions of the Security
Council.
Libya based its application on Article 14 of the Montreal
Convention which gives the Court jurisdiction to decide on ªany
dispute concerning the interpretation or applicationº of the treaty.
The USA and the UK argued that the Court did not have
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jurisdiction. First, Libya had not shown that there existed a legal
dispute between them and, second, if there were such a dispute it did
not concern the interpretation or application of the Montreal
Convention; the question was about the reaction of the international
community to Libya's support for terrorism. The Court predictably
gave this argument very short shrift. It held that the parties disagreed
on whether the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft was governed by
the Montreal Convention; thus there was a dispute as to the legal
regime applicable between the parties. Moreover there was a speciWc
dispute about Article 7 which sets out the duties of States such as
Libya in whose territory alleged oVenders are found, and also a
dispute about Article 11 on the duty of the USA and the UK to
hand over evidence to Libya. Accordingly the Court found by
thirteen votes to three that it had jurisdiction under Article 14 of the
Montreal Convention.
The respondents also argued that the case was not admissible
because the Security Council resolutions requiring surrender of the
accused had deWned the obligations of the parties. The Court held
(by twelve votes to four) that admissibility should be decided at the
date of the application. Because Resolutions 748 and 883 were passed
after the Libyan application they did not make the case inadmissible.
However, the Court was willing to entertain the possibility that
Libya's claims might have become without object after the date of
application, as in the Northern Cameroon (1963 I.C.J. Rep. 38) and
Nuclear Tests (1974 I.C.J. Rep. 272) cases. The USA and UK argued
that any judgment would be devoid of practical purpose. The Court
took a formalistic approach and thus avoided a decision on the
possibility of judicial review. It based its decision on Article 79 of the
Rules of the Court; this governs objections as to jurisdiction,
admissibility and ªother objections, decision on which is requested
before further proceedingsº. The division of objections into categories
is problematic and was challenged by some of the judges, but the
Court did not go into the theoretical diVerences between jurisdiction,
admissibility and other objections. Article 79(7) provides that an
objection may be disposed of at the preliminary stage only if it is of
an exclusively preliminary character; the aim of this provision was to
avoid the type of situation that arose in Barcelona Traction (1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3) and the South West Africa cases (1966 I.C.J. Rep. 3)
where after much delay and full argument on the merits the cases
were eventually decided on the basis of preliminary issues. In the
Lockerbie cases the Court held that the US and UK objections were
not exclusively preliminary; their argument that the Security Council
resolutions determined the rights of the parties involved the claim
that the Security Council resolutions were incompatible with the
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Montreal Convention and prevailed over it. These issues were
inextricably interwoven with the merits.
Therefore the question whether the Security Council resolutions
determined the dispute was put oV. The scope of the power of the
Security Council to make decisions that there exists a threat to
international peace and security and to take action under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter has become topical since the end of the Cold
War with the increase in the activity of the Security Council. Concern
over the legitimacy of Security Council action has supplanted earlier
despair at its inaction. The controversy as to whether the Court has
the power to determine the validity of Security Council resolutions is
obvious in the divisions between the judges in their separate and
dissenting opinions. Four judges expressly declared themselves in
favour of some sort of judicial review; the US and UK judges rejected
this. But it may be that a decision on this issue will prove unnecessary.
In July 1998 the USA and UK, facing a clear danger that the
Security Council sanctions imposed on Libya would no longer be
accepted by African and Arab States, gave signals that they were
prepared to meet Libya's proposal for a compromise: an international
trial of the two accused to be held in a neutral State.
Christine Gray
government of foreign state—proof of existence
The State speaks with one voice in international law. And that voice,
of course, is the executive's, usually, but not invariably, that of the
Foreign and Commonwealth OYce (FCO). Upon a variety of matters
a certiWcate as to certain facts issued by the executive will be regarded
by the courts as conclusive of them. This function was, historically, a
matter of common law though there are now several statutory
provisions in that regard, most notably the Diplomatic Privileges Act
1964 s. 4 and the State Immunity Act 1978 s. 21 identifying
defendants who will have immunity from the jurisdiction (see [1998]
C.L.J. 4).
In one matter, however, the executive no longer speaks. That is as
to the identity of the government of another State. For whilst the
executive will ªcontinue to recognise States in accordance with
international doctrineº (and issue certiWcates), ªwe have decided that
we shall no longer accord recognition to governmentsº (Statement by
the Secretary of State, Lord Carrington, 28 April 1980).
This was clearly a sensible change in practice for two reasons:
Wrst, it prevents the interpretation of recognition of a government as
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ªimplying approvalº of a regime notwithstanding lack of such intent
and, second, it avoids the confusion which had arisen when two
regimes, one recognised as a government de facto and the other as a
government de jure, had existed ostensibly simultaneously: see Haile
Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Co. Ltd. [1938] 1 Ch. 839 and The
Arantzazu Mendi [1939] A.C. 256. In other words, whether a
government exists or not is now a question of fact for the court
alone to resolve in a given case. But how is such question of fact to
be determined? The matter arose in Sierra Leone Telecommunications
Co. Ltd. v. Barclays Bank plc [1998] 2 All E.R. 821.
A coup took place in Sierra Leone on 25 May 1997. The
Government of President Kabbah was exiled to the neighbouring
State of Guinea. The plaintiV company, which was wholly owned by
the Government of Sierra Leone and whose directors, conformably
with its articles of association, were appointed by that Government,
had an account with Barclays Bank in London. The company had
executed a mandate authorising named directors to draw on the
account. Following the coup, the revolutionary ªauthorityº in Sierra
Leone purported to appoint new directors who revoked the mandate
and who instructed the Bank not to honour certain instructions
issued to it by the original directors. The Bank thus ªwas being asked
to make a diYcult choice, whether to continue to honour the original
mandate or to accept the revocationº.
Cresswell J held:
(1) in the absence of contrary provision, the contract between
company and bank was governed by English law, the law of the place
where the account was kept: Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers'
Trust Co. [1989] Q.B. 728, 746 (ªthe principle established in the
Libyan assets caseº is ªsubstantially unchanged by the Contracts
(Applicable Law) Act 1990º);
(2) the ªlaw of the place of incorporation determines who are the
corporation's oYcials authorised to act on its behalf (Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd. (No. 2) [1967] 2 A.C. 853)º; here,
obviously, that was the law of Sierra Leone;
(3) the revolutionary ªauthorityº which had purported to change
the composition of the plaintiV 's board and to revoke the original
mandate was not the government of Sierra Leone. Thus the original
mandate remained in place.
Cresswell J. followed Hobhouse J. in Republic of Somalia v.
Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA [1993] Q.B. 54, noted [1993]
C.L.J. 4. In his view, four factors arose in determining whether the
court should regard such authority as a government.
(a) Is it the constitutional government of the State? Clearly it was
not, though statements by the FCO, whilst referring to the ªlegitimate
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government of President Kabbahº, did not explicitly describe the
alternative regime as ªunconstitutionalº. Those statements expressed
profound disapproval of that regime and chirruped on cheerfully
about its being ªundemocraticº. Whether Cresswell J. and more
particularly the FCO regarded ªconstitutionalº and ªdemocratically
electedº governments as synonymous is unclear.
(b) The degree, nature and stability of the regime's control. The
evidence was clear: the regime had no control over the greater part
of Sierra Leone where ªthere was a lack of a semblance of orderº.
(c) Whether HMG had dealings with the regime. It did not and
its attitude to it had been clearly expressed in the moralising terms
one has come to associate with the latter-day FCO
(d) In marginal cases, has there been some degree of international
recognition? Clearly here there had been none; sanctions had been
imposed upon the ªauthorityº by the Security Council and the EC,
and the Organisation of African Unity and Economic Community of
West African States had condemned it.
Accordingly the composition and authority of the originally
constituted board of the plaintiV company had not been aVected and
the purported revocation of the mandate was ineVectual. This
decision is clearly right and is to be welcomed. But what if the
regime in Sierra Leone had been in eVective control? It takes but
little imagination to think of a number of regimes of which HMG
disapproves and with which it chooses to have only the most formal
dealings owing to, for example, violations of human rights by them.
What would the court do then? Would the decision in Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. Ltd. v. JaVrate (The Rose Mary) [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246 come
into play? And what is the ratio decidendi of that case?
Recognition of governments is not now an issue for an English
court. One can only speculate about how important recognition (or
rather non-recognition) of a State may be for such court in the light
of Carl Zeiss (above, at p. 954 per Lord Wilberforce), Hesperides
Hotels v. Turkish Aegean Holidays Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 205, 218 per Lord
Denning and the Foreign Corporations Act 1991.
John Hopkins
caesarean sections and the right of autonomy
Cynics were unimpressed by the proclamation of the Court of
Appeal in Re MB (Caesarean section) [1997] 2 F.C.R. 541 (noted
[1997] C.L.J. 509) that the law protects a pregnant woman's right to
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autonomy and bodily integrity. The Court of Appeal had held that it
would be unlawful for a doctor to perform a Caesarean section on a
competent woman if she refused to consent to the operation—even if
the lives of the woman and unborn child would be endangered if the
operation was not performed. Cynics argued that the courts would
always circumvent these Wne-sounding principles by Wnding the
woman incompetent to make the decision, as they did in Re MB
itself. However, subsequently in St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust
v. S [1998] 3 All E.R. 673 the Court of Appeal held that a woman
was competent and that a doctor acted unlawfully in carrying out a
Caesarean section on her. The NHS Trust and doctors were therefore
potentially liable in tort for trespass and perhaps even guilty of
criminal oVences.
S, the woman at the centre of St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust
v. S, was 35 weeks pregnant when she was informed by her doctor
that she was suVering from, inter alia, pre-eclampsia and needed to
be admitted to hospital for an induced delivery. She insisted that she
wanted the child to be born naturally and refused to consent to any
medical treatment, even if this meant that her life or that of the
foetus would be endangered. Although S was suVering from
depression her doctors decided that she was competent to refuse to
consent to medical intervention in her pregnancy. Despite this she
was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 at
SpringWeld hospital and later transferred to St. George's hospital.
Following an ex parte application made on behalf of the NHS Trusts,
Hogg J. granted a declaration that it was lawful to carry out a
Caesarean section on S without S's consent. This was done and as a
result a baby girl was born. S did not attempt physically to resist the
operation because she thought that to do so would be undigniWed.
S appealed from Hogg J.'s decision and sought judicial review of the
hospital's actions.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and declared that the
detention and treatment had been unlawful. Judge L.J., who gave the
judgment on behalf of the court, also held that S should not have
been detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. He warned of the
danger of a social worker determining that a patient was suVering
from a mental disorder simply because her decision was irrational or
bizarre. Although the court accepted that S's reactive depression
could constitute a mental disorder for the purposes of the Act, it
could not be said that S required detention for assessment of the
depression, as required to justify detention under section 2 of the
Act. Further, the Act only authorised treatment of the mental
disorder itself (section 63) and the Caesarean section was not
treatment of any mental condition. The Court made it clear that if a
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person was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 and treatment
was required for a condition not related to the mental disorder, the
doctors either required the consent of the patient (if competent) or
needed to determine that the patient was unable to consent to the
treatment and that the treatment was in her best interests.
So could a Caesarean section be performed on a competent
woman who refused to consent? At the heart of the reasoning of
Judge L.J. was a simple proposition: the right of a competent patient
to refuse treatment was absolute and no ªconcessionº should be
made to this principle. ªS is entitled not to be forced to submit to an
invasion of her body against her will, whether her own life or that of
the unborn child depends on it. Her right is not reduced or degraded
merely because her decision to exercise it may appear morally
repugnantº (p. 692). The Court of Appeal stated that an individual's
right of autonomy and bodily integrity outweighed other principles
that the law holds dear, such as sanctity of life.
It should, however, be noted that outside medical law there is less
squeamishness about breaching these rights. Two obvious examples
are section 55 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (intimate
searches without a suspect's consent) and the defence of self-defence
in criminal law. These situations can be distinguished from the one
under discussion here, but suggest that the rights of bodily integrity
and autonomy are not regarded as absolute in the law generally. Is it
really true, as the Court of Appeal suggests, that there are no
circumstances when it is permissible to infringe an individual's bodily
integrity however great the harm caused to other people and however
small the invasion of bodily integrity? No doubt if S's child had been
born alive and needed a kidney transplant few would approve of the
forcible taking of a kidney from S to save the child's life. However if
a fearful epidemic threatened a State's population, would it not be
permissible to take by force a blood sample from a citizen who
appeared to have developed an immunity to the disease? Seeing
autonomy as an absolute value can be challenged as being overly
individualistic. One can argue that the protection of community
values might in extreme cases outweigh an individual's autonomy,
particularly as the values and structure of a society crucially aVect
the range of choices its members can make about how to live their
lives. And it is the protection of those choices which is at the heart
of the right of autonomy.
A crucial point in this case is not brought out in Judge L.J.'s
reasoning: S was not performing a positive act which was posing an
unjust threat to the unborn child, but an omission. In S's own words
she was ªletting nature take its courseº. Therefore the crucial
question should have been whether there is a legal duty on a pregnant
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.194
C.L.J. 441Case and Comment
woman which requires an invasion of her body in order to promote
the foetus's interests. Such a duty would be unlike any imposed
elsewhere by the law.
The legal status of the foetus was also discussed, although given
the paramountcy of the principle of bodily integrity it was not
essential to the decision. Judge L.J. described the foetus as, when
viable, ªcertainly humanº (p. 687), ªa unique organismº (per Lord
Mustill in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1998] AC
245, 256) and ªprotected by the law in a number of diVerent waysº
(p. 687) and stressed that there was a ªprofound physical and
emotional bond between the unborn child and its motherº (p. 695).
However, Judge L.J. stated: ªwhile pregnancy increased the personal
responsibilities of a woman it did not diminish her entitlement to
decide whether or not to undergo medical treatmentº (p. 692). He
rather elusively did not explain whether ªpersonal responsibilitiesº of
pregnancy were legal in nature. However he quoted with approval
Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G (1997) 152
D.L.R. (4th) 193 in which the Supreme Court of Canada had held
that it would be unlawful to detain a glue-sniYng mother for the
purposes of protecting her unborn child.
The Court of Appeal was deeply concerned by the legal
procedures that resulted in Hogg J.'s declaration, in particular that
the declaration had been made without S being given the
opportunity to present her case. The Court of Appeal suggested
guidelines to be followed in these kinds of cases in the future,
most notably that if treatment is going to be carried out against
a patient's wishes the proceedings should be inter partes, and if
necessary the OYcial Solicitor should be instructed to represent
the views of the patient.
On the view of the Court of Appeal, S and her unborn child
should have been allowed to die, thereby upholding S's right to bodily
integrity. The right of autonomy is greatly treasured in our society
but sometimes it calls for the highest of sacriWces.
Jonathan Herring
look before you leap
On a pleasant evening in Darwin, Australia, in April 1987 Nadia
Romeo went with her friends to a popular spot, the Dripstone CliVs,
for a beach party. She was nearly 16 and had little experience of
alcohol, but she and a friend consumed about 150ml of rum in 90
minutes. At about 11.45 pm both she and her friend fell over the
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edge of the cliVs onto the beach below and Nadia suVered high-level
paraplegia. Neither of the girls had any recollection of the
circumstances in which they fell, but there was an area of eroded
ground at the top of the cliVs that might have appeared to the girls
as a path to the beach below (although it did not have this
appearance in daylight, nor would it have appeared this way to a
sober, alert person on the night). In short, it appears that they either
walked over the edge with their heads in the air or attempted to
jump to the beach below (nearly 20 feet) and woefully misjudged the
distance. None the less, Ms Romeo decided to sue the Conservation
Commission of the Northern Territory. Although she lost in every
court, the 5–2 majority decision of the High Court of Australia in
Romeo v. Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory (1998)
72 A.L.J.R. 208 will give little comfort to public bodies responsible
for the control and management of land.
At Wrst glance, the Conservation Commission appears to have
had very little to do with the injury suVered by the plaintiV. By
virtue of the Northern Territory Conservation Commission Act 1980
it was responsible for the management and control of the cliVs as
part of its general duty to promote the conservation and protection
of the natural environment of the Territory, and in the exercise of
these powers it constructed a graded but untarred road to the cliVs
and a car park fenced by low-set logs at the top. However, the
plaintiV 's complaint did not relate to this development work; rather,
the plaintiV 's claim was based on a duty of care owed by the
Commission to take positive steps to prevent her causing herself
foreseeable injury. This is not exceptional; imposing liability for
omissions in the context of ownership and control of land has long
been the province of the law on occupier's liability. However, the
position is complicated where a statutory body exercises powers of
management and control: unlike a private owner, it may have no
ability to limit entry to the land. In addition, the statutory body will
normally have a wide discretion as to how it exercises its powers.
These factors led Brennan C.J. to hold that the liability of a public
body with powers of control and management of property was ªnot
founded in the common law of negligence but in a breach of a
statutory duty to exercise its power and to do so reasonably having
regard to the purpose to be served by an exercise of the powerº (at
p. 214). Although the powers were given to provide protection to
those who entered the property, the manner of their exercise was for
the authority, and this could only be challenged on public law
grounds; thus there could be no disparity between the authority's
public law duty and the duty owed to the entrant as a member of
the class of those entering the premises. In Romeo, the powers were
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.194
C.L.J. 443Case and Comment
exercised on the basis that entrants would exercise reasonable care
for their own safety (as in Aiken v. Kingborough Corporation (1939)
62 C.L.R. 179). This was not an irrational basis on which to exercise
the powers, and in the absence of conduct that created or increased
the risk to the plaintiV the action should fail.
The remainder of the majority dismissed the appeal on the simple
ground that no breach of a common law duty of care had been
established. As the possibility of entrants failing to exercise reasonable
care for their own safety was foreseeable, the Commission owed a
duty of care under the ªundemandingº test set out in Nagle v.
Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 C.L.R 423. However, Toohey,
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. held that it was unreasonable to
require the Commission to fence all elevated areas under its control.
Nor was a warning sign necessary as, unlike Nagle (where the danger
of shallow water was not obvious to the plaintiV diver), the risk of
falling oV the cliV was self-evident. The minority took a similar
approach but diVered on the facts. McHugh and Gaudron JJ.
accepted the plaintiV 's argument that it would only have been
necessary to fence the area immediately adjacent to the car park as
the risk was greatest at that point. The duty under Nagle was
imposed in respect of foreseeable risks (one of which was that
intoxicated persons might be present at the cliVs) and, given the
seriousness of the potential harm and relative ease of erecting an
eVective precaution, the minority held the Commission in breach,
although they accepted that any award would have to be reduced for
contributory negligence.
Although public authorities can take some comfort from the
result, they will be considerably more troubled by the reasoning.
Apart from Brennan C.J., the court did not Wnd it necessary to
consider the relationship between the public and private law duties of
the Commission as the decision was based on other grounds.
However, Kirby J., obiter, said (at 238) that the decision whether to
fence or not would not be within the area of ªpolicyº into which the
court could not pry. None the less, he accepted that virtually every
suggested precaution has Wnancial and economic implications. If this
is correct, a Wnding of negligence appears to second-guess the public
body's own assessment of its Wnancial and economic priorities, a task
entrusted to it by Parliament. In the absence of a public law
justiWcation such as Wednesbury unreasonableness, under what
mandate can a court make this reallocation? This is not to advocate
immunity for public bodies; where actions cause or increase the risk
of damage to the plaintiV it may be appropriate to require the public
body to pay compensation. But where the complaint is of a failure
to act to prevent the plaintiV from suVering damage, there is much to
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be said for the approach of Brennan C.J. that the public body's
private law duty should be no more extensive than its public law
obligations, a view which Wnds tacit support in the majority decision
of the House of Lords in Stovin v. Wise [1996] A.C. 923. Why should
there be a further enquiry as to the liability of the public body (more
accurately its ratepayers or taxpayers) once it has exercised its powers
on the basis that people will take reasonable care for their own
safety?
In this respect, Romeo may conveniently be compared with
another recent decision of the High Court of Australia, Pyrenees
Shire Council v. Day (1998) 72 A.L.J.R. 152. In that case a local
authority was held liable to the tenants of a property that was
destroyed by Wre and to neighbours whose property was also
damaged. The authority had previously inspected the property and
had notiWed the then tenant that the Wreplace should not be used as
it constituted a Wre danger; none the less he continued to use it and
later told the incoming tenants that it was safe to use. They took his
word and used the Wreplace, which ultimately resulted in the Wre that
caused the damage. The local authority was found liable in negligence
for failing to exercise statutory powers to ensure that remedial
measures were actually taken so that the Wreplace was no longer a
danger. This is not the place to embark on a detailed comparison,
but essentially the diVerence in result between the two cases is simply
the Wnding of breach against the local authority in Pyrenees. If these
cases are to be decided at this stage of a negligence action, one
further diYculty should be noted. In Romeo Kirby J. (at p. 235) and
Hayne J. (at p. 241) suggested that the requirement to show a breach
of duty acts as an adequate limitation on a public authority's liability.
However, leaving liability to the arbiter of fact will prevent claims
from being struck out at a preliminary stage, with the result that
public authorities will be forced to take most cases of this nature to
trial or settle, the costs of which will be paid by the taxpayer. Such
public funds might, perhaps, be better spent fencing the edges of
cliVs.
Mark Lunney
ex turpi causa and mental disorder
In September 1992 Christopher Clunis, who had a long history of
mental disorder, was discharged from a hospital where he had been
detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Under
section 117 of that Act, it was the duty of his local Health Authority
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to arrange to provide after-care services for him until it was satisWed
that he no longer needed them. After an interval of twelve weeks,
during which he failed to attend three out-patient appointments and
a mental health assessment arranged for him, Clunis launched an
unprovoked and fatal knife attack on a total stranger, Jonathan Zito,
at Finsbury Park tube station. Clunis was charged with murder, but
a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished
responsibility was accepted, and the trial judge ordered his detention
in a secure mental hospital. Clunis claimed damages for his
incarceration from the Health Authority, arguing that it was in
breach of a common law duty to treat him with professional care
and skill, and that if it had acted more expeditiously he would either
have been detained or consented to become a patient before the date
of the attack and therefore would not have been able to commit
it—in other words, that a timely brief period of hospitalisation would
have saved him from an indeterminate but doubtless much longer
period. The Wrst instance judge refused to strike out the action, but
a unanimous Court of Appeal allowed the Health Authority's appeal:
Clunis v. Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] 2 W.L.R. 902.
The principal reason for the decision was the rule of public policy
that a plaintiV cannot base a claim on his own criminal or immoral
act (ex turpi causa non oritur actio). Beldam L.J., who handed down
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, dismissed the plaintiV 's
argument that this rule did not apply to causes of action founded in
tort, and held that it was not conWned to particular causes of action.
He supported the view of Lords GoV, Keith and Browne-Wilkinson
in Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 A.C. 340 that the rule should be
applied uniformly, and not only in cases where it would ªaVront the
public conscienceº to allow an action to succeed. Given the
seriousness of Clunis's crime, the question of what acts are suYciently
grave to attract the operation of the rule did not arise. A more
diYcult issue was the eVect of Clunis's mental state at the time of
the killing, since Burrows v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 816 established that
the rule only applies where a plaintiV is aware that his conduct is
illegal or immoral. But Beldam L.J. pointed out that there had been
no question of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity; the plea
of diminished responsibility amounted to an admission that Clunis
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. In the court's view,
Meah v. McCreamer [1985] 1 All E.R. 367, where a road accident
victim whose head injury turned him into a rapist was allowed to
recover from the negligent driver damages for the sentence of
imprisonment imposed upon him for the rapes, was not to be
regarded as authoritative, since ex turpi causa had not been argued
on behalf of the driver in that case. It may be recalled, however, that
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in Meah v. McCreamer (No.2) [1986] 1 All E.R. 943, where public
policy was one of the reasons for Meah's failure to obtain damages
from the driver for the compensation which he had been ordered to
pay to the rape victims, Woolf J. defended his own decision in the
earlier case on two grounds, suggesting that it might have been the
same even if ex turpi causa had been raised. The Wrst ground was
that the damages provided a fund to beneWt the plaintiV in respect
of the physical injuries caused to him by the defendant, the
imprisonment presumably being regarded as a loss of amenities
consequent upon those injuries (a point on which Clunis is readily
distinguishable). The second was that the damages provided Meah
with a sum from which he could compensate his rape victims and
support his former wife and child. No such sum will be available to
compensate Mr. Zito's dependants.
McCreamer, however, was a very diVerent kind of defendant from
the Camden and Islington Health Authority. Even if Clunis's claim
had not failed on the public policy ground, it would have been
defeated by the defendant's second argument, that its statutory
obligations to provide after-care did not give rise to a common law
duty of care. Applying X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council
[1995] 2 A.C. 633, Beldam L.J. said that the question was ªprofoundly
inXuenced by the surrounding statutory frameworkº; section 117 was
not apposite to create a private law cause of action for failure to
carry out the duties which it imposed, since the appropriate remedy
for such failure was a complaint to the Secretary of State, and it
would not be just and reasonable to impose a common law duty in
relation to the provision of after-care services, which gave rise to a
relationship of a diVerent nature from that which normally exists
between a doctor and his patient.
Since this was a striking-out application, it was unnecessary to
decide whether, if a duty had been held to exist, the Health
Authority's failure to take more vigorous steps to pursue the elusive
Clunis would have amounted to a breach, although there are hints in
the judgment that it would not. In any event, it may be suggested
that in so far as there may have been a failure in the implementation
of the controversial ªcare in the communityº policy, its true victim
(or perhaps the victim of the policy itself) in this case was not
Christopher Clunis but Jonathan Zito.
C.A. Hopkins
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alice and the judiciary—interpreting contracts
When the discussion between Humpty Dumpty and Alice takes on
the role of leading case and its interpretation becomes a matter of
dispute between a Lord Justice of Appeal and a Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary, then it might be thought that the academic lunatics have
taken over the legal asylum.
Sometimes the decision in a case is only important for the parties,
for those in similar situations, for the state of the law but not for
those who study law. The decision in Investors Compensation Scheme
Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All E.R. 98, or
rather, bits of the speech of Lord HoVmann, should concentrate the
mind of all students of law because it tells us how to read, how to
avoid being self-important and reminds us that contracts are about
getting things done. That his Lordship should have to do this ill
reXects on our legal culture, but the Ptolemaic approach to
expounding law—epicycle upon epicycle in fruitless search of
perfection—still haunts.
The facts of a case are never irrelevant and so must be stated. In
short, investors had been sold home income plans, negligent advice
having been given contrary to rules made under the Financial
Services Act 1986. The Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. (ICS)
was set up to compensate such investors and some claims were
assigned to ICS by investors. The question arose whether the investors
had assigned claims for, inter alia, negligence or misrepresentation,
under a clause excluding from assignment
Any claim (whether sounding in recission for undue inXuence or
otherwise) that you [the investor] have or may have against the
[building society] in which you claim an abatement of sums
which you would otherwise have to pay in respect of sums
borrowed by you from that Society in connection with the
transaction and dealings giving rise to the claim
The trial judge, reversed by the Court of Appeal but upheld by the
majority of the House of Lords (Lord Lloyd of Berwick dissenting),
held that only claims for an abatement of debt, arising out of a claim
for recission, were reserved to assignor investors.
In a nutshell, the question was whether ªAny claim (whether
sounding in recission for undue inXuence or otherwise)º could mean
ªAny claim sounding in recission (whether for undue inXuence or
otherwise)º: in the Court of Appeal Leggatt L.J. relied on the
exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty in Alice Through the
Looking Glass to say that it could not, be it ªcommercial nonsenseº
or not. But Lord HoVmann diVered:
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Alice and Humpty Dumpty were agreed that the word ªgloryº
did not mean ªa nice knock-down argumentº. Anyone with a
dictionary could see that. Humpty Dumpty's point was that ªa
nice knock-down argumentº was what he meant by using the
word ªgloryº. He very fairly acknowledged that Alice, as a
reasonable young woman, could not have realised this until he
told her, but once he had told her, or if, without being expressly
told, she could have inferred it from the back-ground, she would
have had no diYculty in understanding what he meant.
It is preposterous that Lord HoVmann should have to tell lawyers
(inter alios) how to read, but he did so quite superbly. He iterated
that ªfundamental change . . . has overtaken this branch of the lawº,
the result of which
is to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted
by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious
utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the
intellectual old baggage of ªlegalº interpretation has been
discarded.
For the sake of those who will not read Lord HoVmann's speech,
your commentator will summarise his Lordship's summary of ªthe
principlesº—principles which are being cited on each and every
occasion (one is reliably informed).
(1) ªInterpretationº means what any reasonable person in the
position of the parties at the time of contracting would have
understood.
(2) ªBackgroundº includes ªabsolutely anything which would have
aVected the way in which the language of the document would have
been understood by a reasonable manº.
(3) But the law excludes evidence of previous negotiations, of
alleged subjective intent ªfor reasons of practical policyº. As his
Lordship implies, this morass needs some serious work: what is civil
evidence about?
(4) Meaning in this context is not about the meaning of words (in
vacuo? ) but what the parties using those words against the relevant
background would have understood the meaning to be.
(5) We neither assume easily that people make mistakes in formal
documents nor that in commercial contracts we should do commercial
nonsense in the name of the parties' presumed intention.
At this point the reader might appeal to that famous schoolboy
sage Nigel Molesworth and reXect on his adage ªany foole knoº, but
that is no defence: as Lord HoVmann remarks, ªMany people,
including politicians, celebrities and Mrs Malaprop, mangle meanings
and syntax but nevertheless communicate tolerably clearly what they
are using the words to meanº. If we fail to understand language as a
shared practice then we will cease to be social animals. No one can
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possibly object to ªterms of artº being shared by those in particular
trades, businesses or branches of the law, but it has come to a sorry
pass when we have to have a Lord of Appeal tell us what we should
have learnt When We Were Very Young—at least when we were law
students. Commercial law has to work and contract is the supreme
vehicle for doing that work: ªthe old intellectual baggageº referred
to by Lord HoVmann simply gums up the works. No doubt, given
the last word, Alice would have said ªcuriouser and curiouserº—but
then she was wise beyond her years.
David Fleming
restitution for services performed under an illegal contract
Alaga & Co. was a Wrm of solicitors representing a number of
Somali refugees applying for asylum in the UK. Ali Mohamed, a
leading Wgure in the Somali community in the UK, sued Alaga:
Mohamed v. Alaga & Co. [1998] 2 All E.R. 720. He had introduced
the refugees to Alaga and wanted to be rewarded for making the
introductions. He claimed that Alaga had entered into an oral
contract with him whereby it undertook to pay him half of any fees
it received from the Legal Aid Board in respect of refugees that he
introduced to the Wrm. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Alaga denied making
any such agreement. It was unlawful for it to do so. The rules of the
Law Society have legal force under the Solicitors Act 1974, s. 31.
Under rule 3 of those rules a solicitor may accept introductions of
business from other people so long as he or she does not reward the
introducers of that business in any way. Under rule 7 of the same
rules a solicitor is not allowed to share or agree to share his or her
fees with anyone else except other practising solicitors, his or her
employees and his or her retired partners. Lightman J. assumed, for
the purposes of deciding the case, that Alaga did agree to pay
Mohamed for any refugees he introduced to the Wrm.
The contract, he held, was unenforceable. To hold otherwise
would involve the court in compelling Alaga to do precisely that
which Parliament had decreed that Alaga must not do—pay someone
for introducing business to the Wrm and share fees earned by it with
someone not authorised to receive those fees. Lightman J. also held
that Mohamed would be barred from bringing a claim for his services
in restitution. Such a claim would be based on the principle that a
defendant who freely accepts a beneWt arising out of work done by
the plaintiV under a contract with the defendant must pay that
plaintiV a reasonable sum for that beneWt if the plaintiV, for some
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reason, cannot make any claim for his work under the contract:
Sumpter v. Hedges [1898] 1 Q.B. 673; Craven-Ellis v. Canons Ltd.
[1936] 2 K.B. 403; Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943,
s. 1(3). To apply that principle here would result in the court's
compelling Alaga to pay Mohamed a reasonable sum for the business
he introduced to the Wrm—again, something that is forbidden by
legislation. So Mohamed's claim in restitution for his services was
denied.
The result reached by Lightman J. is desirable. As he pointed out
(at p. 724e–j), public policy demands that the courts should strongly
discourage the making of agreements of the kind Mohamed claimed
that Alaga made with him. The existence of such agreements creates
a risk that someone in need of legal services will be recommended to
a Wrm which is not best suited to handling his business and will be
overcharged for the services he receives as the Wrm he employs seeks
to recoup the commission paid out for obtaining his custom. People
in Mohamed's position will be discouraged from entering into such
agreements as a result of Lightman J.'s decision. They will know that
the courts will not in any circumstances take any steps to ensure that
people who Wnd business for solicitors' Wrms for reward are made
better oV as a result.
Mohamed might have been able to obtain something for the work
he did for Alaga & Co. by another route. Lightman J. conceded (at
p. 725j) that if Alaga did agree to pay Mohamed for any introductions
he made to the Wrm, it might have owed Mohamed a duty to tell
him that it was required by law not to make such an agreement. If
Alaga owed Mohamed such a duty, he could have sued Alaga for
damages for its breach, claiming that if that breach had not occurred
he would not have worked for Alaga, thereby obtaining damages
equal to the value to him of the time and eVorts he spent working
for Alaga. Alternatively, and more ambitiously, Mohamed could have
argued that the principle of liability in Planche´ v. Colburn (1831)
8 Bing. 14—which says that if I do work under a contract with you
but have no right to be compensated for that work under the contract
because it is incomplete, I can still recover a reasonable sum for the
work I did even if the work I did was of no beneWt to you, if the
reason I did not complete the work was because your breach of
contract made further performance on my part futile—should be
extended to allow him to claim a reasonable sum for the time and
eVorts he spent working for Alaga. SigniWcantly, the 1974 Act would
not have prevented either of these claims against Alaga from
succeeding. Success would not reward Mohamed for introducing
business to Alaga; it would compensate him for giving up his time
and eVorts to drum up that business. Perhaps bringing a claim for
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damages or for compensation under the principle in Planche´ v.
Colburn would not have beneWted Mohamed much—there could not
have been much work involved in his handing out business cards to
refugees he came across in his day-to-day activities. But if he had
brought such a claim, it is submitted that the court should have
denied it on grounds of public policy, so as further to discourage
people in Mohamed's position from entering into agreements to Wnd
business for solicitors' Wrms for reward. Of course, it may be
contended, such a stance can only encourage solicitors' Wrms to try
and lure people like Mohamed into Wnding business for them. They
will know that they will not be held liable to pay a penny to people
who succumb to their promises of reward and attempt to Wnd
business for them. However, they will still be subject to the sanctions
of the Law Society—and it is to be hoped that the Law Society has
rigorously investigated Mohamed's claims and taken any appropriate
action.
Nicholas J. McBride
sale or return contracts: the right to reject
Rather than buying goods outright, retailers often Wnd it convenient
to receive goods under a ªsale or returnº arrangement. These
agreements are not contracts of sale, but rather bailment arrangements
that give the bailee the right either to buy or to reject the goods.
A sale or return contract may require that the right to reject can be
exercised only by the bailee physically returning any unwanted goods;
however, in the absence of an express stipulation to this eVect, these
contracts are generally construed to require merely that the bailee
give notice of rejection and make the goods available for collection
by the bailor. The question then arises: what form must this notice
take, and at what stage must the goods be made available for
collection? These matters were considered by the Court of Appeal in
Atari Corporation (U.K.) Ltd. v. Electronics Boutique Stores (U.K.)
Ltd. [1998] 2 W.L.R. 66.
The plaintiV, Atari, had supplied the defendant with electronic
games on terms that speciWed ªfull sale or return until 31 January
1996º. On 19 January 1996, the defendant sent a letter to the eVect
that it had decided to cease to sell the product. It further indicated
that it had requested all its stores to return the unwanted stock, after
which it would provide a complete list of the goods to be returned.
What was the eVect of this communication? While the defendant
argued that it had given an eVective notice of its decision to return
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the goods, the plaintiV countered that this could not be so for two
reasons: Wrst, the letter had failed to describe the goods to be
returned with suYcient speciWcity; and, secondly, the defendant did
not have the goods available for collection at the time at which the
notice was served. Hence, the plaintiV argued that, because the letter
contemplated future action being taken to exercise the right of
rejection (i.e. the compilation of a comprehensive list and the physical
collection of the goods to be rejected), it could be interpreted only as
a notice of intention to reject. The plaintiV further contended that,
pursuant to section 18, rule 4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, because
it had retained the goods without giving an eVective notice of
rejection, property passed to the defendant at the time Wxed for the
return of the goods. The matter came to the Court of Appeal after a
summary judgment was given in favour of the plaintiV and upheld
on appeal to judge in Chambers.
Waller, Phillips and Auld L.JJ. all dismissed the notion that an
eVective rejection required that the items to be returned be
individually listed. Instead, they took the view that a generic
description was suYcient. In dealing with the plaintiV 's argument
that the notice could not be eVective because the goods were not
ready for collection, the court stressed that whether the notice was
adequate and what the prospective buyer, as bailee, did with the
goods were two separate questions. If upon giving adequate notice a
bailee failed to make the goods available for collection within a
reasonable time, he or she would be liable for conversion. This,
however, could not aVect the validity of the notice. Thus, after giving
notice to reject, the bailee is bound to return the goods. Any acts by
the bailee that are inconsistent with the bailor's title will not amount
to adoption of the transaction vesting title in the bailee; rather, they
will constitute wrongful interference with the bailor's property.
Auld L.J. observed that the fact that the parties provided for
rejection to be eVected by a notice of rejection rather than physical
return suggested that there was to be some delay after the notice was
given and before the return of the goods to the supplier. He further
argued that a rule allowing for generic description was better suited
to the reality of arrangements involving large retailing outlets that
would require some time to collect the stock in question after making
the decision to discontinue sales. Thus, he argued that this rule would
suit both parties because it would allow the supplier ªto Wnd at the
earliest moment a purchaser for the rejected goods, wherever they
are; similarly, it is in the interest of the prospective buyer speedily to
shed his contingent contractual liability to buyº.
Auld L.J. was no doubt right to conclude that the rule suits
prospective buyers; it will enable them to make a late decision to
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reject the goods without having to provide a precise inventory, let
alone to make the goods available for collection. However, sellers
might object to this rule because a rejection notice that gives no
more than a generic description of the goods to be returned does not
leave the supplier in a position to know precisely how much of the
stock will be returned—which is surely crucial if arrangements are to
be made to sell on the stock. However, the Court's approach to the
question of the eVectiveness of notice should not prove unduly harsh
upon suppliers. Waller L.J. suggested that it might be that the
supplier was entitled to be put in a position to collect any goods that
the defendants were seeking to return by the speciWed date. On this
reading ªfull sale or return until 31 January 1996º would require that
the notice be given and the goods be made available for collection by
that date. Even if the date speciWed were treated as the Wnal date for
notice rather than for making the goods available for collection, at
worst, the goods would have to be put at the disposal of the bailee
within a reasonable time of notice being given.
The decision in Atari Corporation (U.K.) Ltd. v. Electronics
Boutique Stores (U.K.) Ltd. is to be welcomed for clarifying an area
of the law of sales that is surprisingly short of case law. It is now
clear that if sellers want to ensure that they are in a position in
which they have a complete inventory of the goods that are to be
returned at the time of rejection, they must stipulate this in their
contract with the prospective buyer.
Craig Rotherham
hunting for advantage
Hunting with hounds raises Werce passions, which blaze both on
and oV the Weld. In our ever more litigious society, it was practically
inevitable that these passions would lead to litigation. So it was that
the National Trust's decision to stop stag hunting on its estates in
Somerset and Devon came to be challenged in court. In Scott v.
National Trust [1998] 2 All E.R. 705, Robert Walker J. had to deal
with various tactical applications arising in the challenge to the
National Trust's decision: his Lordship's judgment was not intended
to, and did not, come even close to an opinion on the vexed question
of stag hunting itself
Two sets of proceedings were at issue, and one contemplated set
of proceedings. First, Mrs. Scott and others had begun proceedings,
under Charities Act 1993, s. 33(1), against the National Trust and
the Attorney-General as the guardian of charity. All parties accepted
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that the proceedings in question were charity proceedings within the
meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the plaintiVs had received the
requisite permission of the Charity Commissioners to prosecute that
action. The object of the action was to quash the decision of the
National Trust to stop stag hunting in the West Country. Secondly,
Mrs. Scott, together with other co-plaintiVs, had commenced an
action by writ against the National Trust, with like object in mind.
Thirdly, the plaintiVs in the charity proceedings sought leave to bring
judicial review proceedings against the National Trust, again with the
object of quashing its decision about stag hunting.
As well as the application for leave, there were two interlocutory
applications in the subsisting proceedings before Robert Walker J.
First, the National Trust sought to have the charity proceedings and
the writ action struck out: the Trust alleged that both actions
disclosed no reasonable cause of action, or were otherwise an abuse
of the process of the court; in addition, the Trust argued that the
charity proceedings should be struck out because the plaintiVs in
that action were not entitled to bring such proceedings, as they were
not ªpersons interested in the charityº for the purposes of Charities
Act 1993, s. 33(1). Secondly, the plaintiVs in the subsisting actions
sought interlocutory injunctions, apparently to allow stag hunting to
continue pending Wnal determination of the litigation. In the end, all
the applications were refused.
In the strike-out applications, the judgment of Robert Walker J.
concentrated on the National Trust's second allegation, concerning
Charities Act 1993, s. 33(1). The question of who is interested in a
charity for the purposes of that provision, or its statutory
predecessors, has never been deWnitively answered by the courts;
indeed, the courts have warned against seeking deWnition of a matter
which Parliament deliberately, and perhaps unavoidably, left so vague.
However, some useful points of guidance can be taken from the Scott
case.
The requisite interest in a charity seems to be an interest, greater
than that of an ordinary member of the public, in securing the due
administration of a charity. The fact that the plaintiV in charity
proceedings may further some other purpose of his through the
proceedings does not necessarily rebut his claim to have the required
interest; yet if the real aim of the proceedings is not to secure the due
administration of a charity, but rather to further the plaintiV 's other
interests, then the plaintiV will not have the necessary interest in the
charity. Noteworthy in this connection is the judge's view that
membership of the National Trust (Mrs. Scott was a member, one of
around two million) might not alone be suYcient interest for the
purposes of the present action, challenging a policy decision of the
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Trust. One wonders whether a court would draw the same conclusion
if the subject of charity proceedings were the alleged infringement of
a member's rights under the charity's constitution. Perhaps the
subject matter of charity proceedings may be relevant to a decision
about whether some person has suYcient interest in a charity to
bring those proceedings.
The requirement that a plaintiV have an interest in charity
proceedings acts as a Wltering criterion, protecting charities from
frivolous, vexatious or multiple actions. However, the notion of an
interest does not have to be drawn too narrowly in order to achieve
that eVect, as charities also have the added protection inherent in the
need for the Charity Commissioners, or the court, to consent to the
prosecution of charity proceedings.
Mrs. Scott's action for leave to bring judicial review proceedings
raised other diYcult questions. Her attempt to seek procedural
advantage through such an application was not itself stigmatised.
What concerned Robert Walker J. was the overlap between that
application and the charity proceedings, which the National Trust
had just failed to halt. His Lordship, diVering from the Charity
Commissioners, thought that the proposed proceedings for judicial
review would constitute charity proceedings, within the deWnition of
Charities Act 1993, s. 33(8): he took a wide, pragmatic view of the
phrase ªproceedings . . . brought under the court's jurisdiction with
respect to charities . . .º, preferring not to restrict the deWnition to
proceedings within the long established equitable jurisdiction over
charities. It followed that such proceedings would need the permission
of the Charity Commissioners or the court under Charities Act 1993,
s. 33, as well as leave for the purposes of R.S.C. Order 53. No such
permission or leave was granted. While the National Trust was, prima
facie, a suYciently ªpublicº body to be amenable to judicial review,
charity proceedings provided perfectly good means of holding its
oYcers to account, so that the court declined to exercise its discretion
and grant the necessary leaves.
Finally, there remained the matter of the interlocutory applications
for interim injunctive relief. Robert Walker J. considered the grounds
on which trustees' exercises of discretion can be reviewed. He
acknowledged that decisions must be made in good faith, on the
basis of proper information (but without unauthorised delegation)
and also reasonably, though the latter criterion must not interpreted
too narrowly, or review of trustees' decisions by the court will become
too like an appeal against them. His Lordship acknowledged the
clear similarities between the review of Wduciary discretions and the
review of administrative decisions, though trustees are not a court, or
an administrative tribunal: indeed, in a dictum which seems destined
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to return to the courts, his Lordship said that he was
ª. . . inclined to think that legitimate expectation may have some
part to play in trust law as well as in judicial review cases . . .º. In
the event, the National Trust had not acted in such fashion as to
justify the issue of an interlocutory injunction.
Hunting for tactical advantage in hostile litigation may not tell us
anything about the rights or wrongs of hunting for stags with hounds.
However, it has emphasised the potential breadth of judicial review,
some of the diYculties to be faced in deWning the scope of judicial
review, and the increasing awareness of judicial review by private
lawyers (and even trust lawyers). Also within the Scott case are some
tantalising possibilities for the review of trustees' discretion, always a
diYcult and fascinating topic, and one increasingly litigated,
particularly in the context of pension funds.
Richard Nolan
negligent misstatement—a healthier decision for company
directors
The decision of the House of Lords in Williams v. Natural Life
Health Foods Ltd. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830, reversing the Court of
Appeal's decision ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131), examines the issue of an
agent's liability for negligent misstatement. Of course, agents will be
personally responsible for their own negligence, even if that tort is
committed while on the principal's business, but what is their
responsibility for the negligence of their principal? Logically the
answer is ªnoneº, and certainly in a company context statements
made by directors on behalf of their companies have traditionally led
to liability for the principal alone: ªa company director is only to be
held personally liable for the company's negligent misstatements if
the plaintiVs can establish some special circumstances setting the case
apart from the ordinary . . .º ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131, 152 per
Hirst L.J.). The Court of Appeal's decision in Williams, however,
threatened to expand this category of ªspecial circumstancesº to such
an extent as to make personal liability the norm for directors, at least
in the context of small companies.
The facts of Williams were simple. Mr. Mistlin had built up an
extensive knowledge of the health food business over a number of
years. He then set up a company, Natural Life, of which he was the
sole director and the only substantial shareholder, in order to
franchise the concept of retail health food shops. The plaintiVs
approached Natural Life with a view to acquiring a franchise and
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.194
C.L.J. 457Case and Comment
Natural Life supplied them with favourable Wnancial projections.
Encouraged, the plaintiVs entered the franchise but, inevitably, the
projections were incorrect, and negligently so, and the plaintiVs'
franchise failed. The plaintiVs sought to recover their losses from
Natural Life, but when the company was wound up the plaintiVs
turned to Mr. Mistlin, alleging that he had played a prominent part
in compiling the projections (which he had) and that he had thereby
assumed a personal responsibility to them for the negligent
misstatements. This was despite the fact that Mr. Mistlin had not
met the plaintiVs or had any pre-contractual dealings with them.
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the knowledge
and experience of the company resided in Mr. Mistlin and that in
compiling the projections he had acted ªqua Mr. Mistlin rather than
qua directorº ([1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 131, 153 per Hirst L.J.). According
to the Court of Appeal this personal expertise, which, as Sir Patrick
Russell (dissenting) pointed out, will almost inevitably attach to the
ªone manº in a one man company, meant that Mr. Mistlin had
stepped outside his position as agent/director and was therefore
personally responsible for the plaintiVs' losses to the tune of £85,000.
The House of Lords unanimously disagreed, holding Mr. Mistlin
to have no personal liability to the plaintiVs. In the process Lord
Steyn, giving the leading judgment, made a number of important
points about claims for negligent misstatement under Hedley Byrne
and, accordingly, his judgment is likely to provide the starting point
for Hedley Byrne claims in the future. First, his Lordship conWrmed
Lord GoV 's statement in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995]
2 A.C. 145 that the Hedley Byrne principle extends beyond negligent
misstatements so that it can apply to economic loss caused by the
negligent provision of services. Secondly, and more importantly, Lord
Steyn conWrmed the view in Henderson that the basis of a Hedley
Byrne claim is an assumption of responsibility by the maker of the
statement towards the plaintiV. His Lordship felt (rightly, it is
submitted) that ªthe general criticismº which has been voiced about
the principle of assumption of responsibility (see, e.g., Barker,
ªUnreliable Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligenceº (1993)
109 L.Q.R. 461; Hepple, ªThe Search for Coherenceº (1997) 50
Current Legal Problems 67) is ªoverstatedº. The test for an
assumption of responsibility is an objective one: ªthe primary focus
must be on things said or done by the defendant or on his behalf in
dealings with the plaintiVº (p. 835) rather than the state of mind of
the defendant. In the context of a principal–agent relationship, in
order to establish personal liability between the agent and a third
party, the issue was whether, judged objectively, the agent
(Mr. Mistlin) had assumed personal responsibility towards the third
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party for the statements made or services provided. On the facts, he
had not. A role for reasonable reliance did remain under a Hedley
Byrne claim, according to Lord Steyn, but not as a method of
establishing liability as such. Rather, reasonable reliance is important
as a secondary issue, once an assumption of responsibility has been
established, in order to demonstrate the causative link between the
negligent statement and the plaintiVs' loss. Despite academic niggles,
the central position of the assumption of responsibility in Hedley
Byrne claims in the near future looks assured.
For company lawyers, the Court of Appeal's judgment had
worrying implications. Mr. Mistlin's situation was by no means an
uncommon one. Very often individuals who have built up expertise
in a particular Weld set up companies in order to gain the beneWts of
limited liability (as shareholders) and separate legal personality (as
directors). The House of Lords' decision indicates a welcome return
to the orthodox view that those beneWts should not be removed
lightly; indeed, something quite out of the ordinary will be required.
A director would have to create the clear impression that he was
personally answerable for the advice or services, for example, by
providing the services directly to the plaintiVs and invoicing them for
the work done on his own headed notepaper rather than that of the
company (Fairline Shipping Corp. v. Adamson [1975] Q.B. 180). The
mere fact that Mr. Mistlin was the ªone manº behind the company
and that the knowledge and experience of the company resided with
him was rightly held to be insuYcient to found personal liability. The
directors of small companies will undoubtedly wish to heave a
collective sigh of relief.
Jennifer Payne
silhouette and the limits of free trade
Everybody loves a bargain. Supermarkets have found that the sale of
cut price designer goods along with the groceries gives them the edge
over their rivals, when consumer spending on food is expected to
slump (The Times, 22 April 1998). The catch is that trade mark
proprietors, such as Calvin Klein, having nurtured brand images, in
which high prices and exclusivity reinforce each other, decline to sell
their goods to the supermarkets, preferring to control distribution
through specialist outlets. The supermarkets' response has been to go
shopping on the ªgrey marketº: buying branded goods from third
parties, which are sold more cheaply outside the European
Community (EC) and the wider European Economic Area (EEA),
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and importing them into the EEA for resale. The issue decided by
the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice, Silhouette
International Schmied GmbH & Co. Kg v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft
mbH, Case C-355/96 (1998), was whether the importation and
resale of such goods without the brand owner's consent constitutes
trade mark infringement.
Silhouette, an Austrian company, produces expensive spectacles,
which it markets worldwide. The ªSilhouetteº mark is registered in
most countries. Silhouette supplies its products only to approved
outlets in Austria and elsewhere. In 1995, it sold 21,000 ªout of
fashionº frames to a Bulgarian company, on condition that they
should be sold only in Bulgaria or the former USSR. The frames,
delivered to Bulgaria, found their way to the Austrian company,
Hartlauer, ªknown for its low pricesº. Silhouette had not previously
supplied Hartlauer because it considered that distribution by the
defendant would be ªharmful to its imageº. Silhouette sought to
restrain Hartlauer from selling its frames in Austria under its mark,
where they had not been put on the market by Silhouette or by third
parties with its consent.
The key question that the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof put to
the ECJ in Silhouette was whether Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark
Directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to
trade marks (89/104/EEC) means that a trade mark proprietor is
entitled to prohibit a third party from using the mark for goods that
have been put on the market under that mark in a State that is not a
Contracting State to the EEA. It also asked whether a trade mark
proprietor could seek an order to prevent a third party using the
mark on the basis of Article 7(1) alone. This latter question,
particularly relevant to Austria's trade mark law, was answered in the
negative and will not be considered further here.
Article 7(1) addresses the exhaustion of trade mark rights in the
Community. It prevents a proprietor from prohibiting use of his
mark in relation to goods that have been put on the market in the
EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with his consent. It is
incorporated into UK law by section 10(1) of the 1994 Trade Marks
Act. In the UK, before the 1994 Act, international exhaustion
appeared to have been ruled out by the decision in Colgate Palmolive
v. Markwell Finance [1989] R.P.C. 49 C.A., although, signiWcantly, the
goods involved were of inferior quality. But does Article 7(1) also
provide for exhaustion of trade mark rights on goods Wrst put on the
market outside the EEA?
The ECJ held that it did not. According to the Court, Article 5
of the Directive sets out the rights conferred by trade mark, and
these include the entitlement to prevent third parties from using in
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the course of trade an identical sign on identical goods without the
proprietor's consent. Among the practices which the proprietor is
entitled to prohibit is the import or export of goods under the
relevant trade mark. Article 7 states that in the speciWc circumstances
of the goods having been put on the market by the proprietor or
with his consent, the exclusive rights conferred by a trade mark are
exhausted. But according to the ECJ, such ªexhaustion occurs only
where the products have been put on the market in the Community
[or the EEA]º.
The defendant's argument, endorsed by the Swedish Government,
was that Article 7 leaves open the question of how far exhaustion
should extend beyond the EEA, in which respect Member States are
allowed to make their own rules. The plaintiVs, backed by the UK
Government among others, responded that giving Member States
such freedom was contrary to the Directive's aim of ultimately
harmonising provisions of national law which most directly aVect the
functioning of the internal market. The ECJ agreed that the Directive
must be construed as ªembodying a complete harmonisation of the
rights conferred by a trade markº, except that individual Members
could give greater protection to marks with a reputation (Article
5(2)). It could not, therefore, be construed as giving Members the
option to vary the national law to allow for international exhaustion
of trade mark rights. To decide otherwise would be to negate the
purpose of the Directive, ªnamely to safeguard the functioning of the
internal marketº, and ªinevitablyº to create barriers to the free
movement of goods. An objection that the Directive, adopted on the
basis of Article 100A of the EC Treaty, could not regulate relations
between Member and non-Member countries missed the point. The
Directive was intended to deWne the rights of Community trade mark
proprietors, not to regulate their relations with non-Member States.
The latter could always be accomplished through agreements between
the Community, itself, and non-Member countries over international
exhaustion: a matter for policy, not legal argument.
The ECJ failed to deal with a number of knotty questions, such
as what constitutes consent or how EC competition laws may be
aVected by its decision. Furthermore, in its desire not to make policy,
the ECJ, inevitably, made policy by default. When the world worships
at the altar of free trade, the Silhouette decision may appear
perversely protectionist. But the fundamental purpose of the EC, of
which the ECJ is merely one institution, is to ªprotectº the trading
interests of its Members. In this context, a salient fact, mentioned in
the earlier Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs (29 January 1998),
may be that other non-Member States do not provide for international
exhaustion of trade mark rights.
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Finally, does the Silhouette decision override the interests of
consumers in acquiring designer goods as cheaply as those living
outside the EEA? There is a counter-argument here too. The
expansionist instincts of the large retailers, able to beneWt from
economies of scale, has led to the demise of many smaller retailers.
A decision which allowed for the international exhaustion of trade
mark rights would enable the large retailers to use these same
marketing advantages against specialist retailers of designer goods,
undoubtedly with similar consequences, a development which may
well lead to a signiWcant diminution of consumer choice in the
long run.
Jennifer Davis
a broader construction of the ec treaty provisions on
citizenship?
In Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern (Case C-85/96, judgment of
12 May 1998, not yet reported), the Court of Justice has taken a step
towards the clariWcation of the real force of the EC Treaty provisions
on citizenship. Mrs. Martinez Sala was a Spanish national lawfully
resident in Germany since 1968 and employed there at intervals
between 1976 and 1989. In 1993, she applied to the State of Bavaria
for a child-raising allowance, a beneWt granted to all residents in
Germany who had a dependent child in their care and were either
unemployed or had no full-time employment. Her application was
rejected on the grounds that at the time that she applied for the
beneWt she was not in possession of a residence permit, a requirement
that had to be met by all non-German nationals. The central issue in
the case was, therefore, whether Mrs. Martinez Sala had been
discriminated against.
In the Wrst part of its judgment, the Court examined whether the
facts of the case could fall within the scope ratione materiae and
ratione personae of Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social
security schemes to employed and self-employed persons and their
families moving within the Community ([1971] O.J. Sp. Ed. (II), 416)
and of Regulation 1612/68 on free movement of workers within the
Community ([1968] O.J. Sp. Ed. (II), 475). Regulation 1408/71 lays
down the principle of equality of treatment for all the residents in a
Member State to whom the Regulation applies in the receipt of social
security beneWts, whereas Regulation 1612/68 enshrines the principle
of non-discrimination between national and non-national workers,
inter alia, in the enjoyment of social advantages.
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The Court considered Wrst whether the child-raising allowance
could be classiWed as a social security beneWt (i.e family beneWt) or
as a social advantage. It had no diYculties in concluding that the
beneWt could be classiWed as both a family beneWt (the Court invoked
its decision in Hoever and Zachow (Joined Cases C-245/94 and
C-312/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-4895) where it had already considered the
nature of the same beneWt) and a social advantage (given that the
beneWt was granted, inter alia, to national part-time workers and
therefore could be linked to a contract of employment). What is
interesting about the decision in this respect is that the Court
conWrmed the cumulative application of both Regulations to the
same beneWt, a point which it had set out for the Wrst time in clear
terms in Commission v. Luxembourg (Case C-111/91, [1993] ECR I-
817). This Wnding had been ambiguous given that in some cases the
Court seemed only to consider whether a beneWt could be a social
advantage if it had previously decided that it was not a social security
beneWt (Case 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] E.C.R. 973 and more recently
Case C-57/96 Meints [1997] E.C.R. I-6689). Secondly, the Court
considered whether Mrs. Martinez Sala fell within the scope ratione
personae of those regulations (i.e. was she an ªemployed personº or
a ªworkerº?), but was unable to reach a decision, since the national
court had failed to provide suYcient information. Advocate General
la Pergola expressed strong doubts that she could be classiWed as a
worker within the meaning of the case law.
In the second part of the judgment, the Court concluded that the
requirement imposed on non-nationals to be in possession of a
residence permit to receive the beneWt was clearly discriminatory.
A long-standing line of case law conWrms that residence permits have
a declaratory force but not a constitutive one (Case 48/75 Royer
[1976] E.C.R. 497) and here, the possession of the permit was
constitutive of the right to receive the beneWt. But, as seen above, it
was unclear whether Mrs. Martinez Sala could be classiWed either as
a worker or as an employed person. The question therefore remained
of under which provisions of EC law Mrs. Martinez Sala could be
put so that she might have the right to invoke the principle of non-
discrimination. On this point the Commission argued that even if she
did not come within the scope of the regulations mentioned above,
she could rely directly on Article 8a EC, which provides for the right
of free movement and residence for citizens of the Union. This
provision has been, in the absence of a clear decision by the Court,
the subject of an intense academic debate which has largely concluded
that, in the present state of EC law, the Wnal proviso to Article 8a
EC subjecting the right to free movement and residence to the ªlimits
and conditionsº laid down by the Treaty and secondary legislation
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.194
C.L.J. 463Case and Comment
nulliWes any possible addition to the already existing regulation of
the free movement of persons. Thus, in 1990, three EC directives had
already set out the right to residence for non-economically active
persons provided that they have suYcient resources and are covered
by sickness insurance. The right of residence in Article 8a EC seems
therefore to be subject to the same limitations and has been
interpreted in this way by the English courts (R. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex parte Vitale [1995] All E.R. (EC) 946,
[1996] All E.R. (EC) 461 (C.A.)) and by the Court of First Instance
(Case T-66/95 Kuchlenz-Winter [1997] E.C.R. II-637). Hence, it
appears that Member States can deny to non-economically active EU
citizens the right to reside in their territories if the latter constitute a
burden to their social security systems. Given that Mrs. Martinez
Sala did not have suYcient resources, the interpretation of Article 8a
EC suggested by the Commission was a far-reaching one.
The Court, guided on this point by the powerful Opinion of AG
La Pergola, followed a diVerent reasoning and considered that there
was no need to invoke Article 8a EC, as the right of Mrs. Martinez
Sala to reside in Germany was uncontested by the German
Government. Mrs. Martinez Sala could, however, rely on Article 8(2)
EC which attributes to the status of citizen of the Union the rights
and duties laid down by the Treaty, and amongst which the right not
to suVer discrimination on grounds of nationality takes centre stage.
The Court, as it had done in the past (Case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996]
E.C.R. I-929) managed to avoid interpreting Article 8a EC.
It is suggested that the dramatic outcome of the case belies its
practical signiWcance. On the one hand, the Court concluded that in
all situations that fall ratione materiae within the scope of the Treaty,
a citizen of the Union lawfully resident in a Member State can invoke
the principle of non-discrimination. This is, in eVect, a broad
construction of Article 8 EC and one that shows that the provisions
on citizenship have real teeth. It is, moreover, consistent with the
Court's generous application of the principle of non-discrimination
evidenced in decisions such as Cowan (Case 186/87 [1989] ECR 195).
On the other hand, this interpretation was only made possible
because the Member State had already recognized the right of
residence. The issue of whether Article 8a EC gives the right of
residence a wider content than the previously existing measures
remains the crucial question. This case has not provided an answer.
Albertina Albors-Llorens
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keck (re)applied
After years of uncertainty over the precise scope of Article 30 of
the EC Treaty, the decision in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91
Keck and Mithourd [1993] E.C.R. I-6097 was thought to have
introduced some clarity. It will be recalled that in Keck the Court
made a distinction between, on the one hand, ªproduction
requirementsº or ªproduct characteristicsº to which the decision in
Cassis applies (para. 15) and, on the other, ªcertain selling
arrangementsº which do not breach Article 30 provided ªthat those
provisions apply to all aVected traders operating within the national
territory and provided that they aVect in the same manner, in law
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other
Member Statesº (para. 16). The Court continued that where this
proviso is satisWed, the national restrictions are not by nature such as
to prevent the access of foreign goods to the market or to impede
access any more than they impede the access of domestic products
(para. 17).
Once equipped with the ruling in Keck the Court applied it with
enthusiasm. For example, it found that national rules relating to ªthe
times and places at which the goods in question may be sold to
consumersº were certain selling arrangements (Cases C-401/92 and
C-402/93 Tankstation `t Heukske vof and J.B.E. Boermans [1994] E.C.R.
I-2199), as were rules concerning Sunday trading (Case
C-69/93 and C-258/93 Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco de Commune di
Capena and others [1994] E.C.R. I-2355; Cases C-418 etc./93 Semeraro
Casa [1996] E.C.R. I-2975). The application of Keck to such cases
concerning the Wxed circumstances in which goods are sold, at one
stage removed from the actual importer of the product, is largely
uncontroversial. However, controversy has surrounded the unthinking
application of Keck to more ªdynamicº situations, more closely
linked to the activities of the importer, such as national restrictions
on advertising (Case C-292/92 Hu¨nermund v. Landesapothkerkammer
Baden-Wurtemberg [1993] E.C.R. I-6787; Case C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec
v. TFI Publicite´ [1995] E.C.R. I-179) and other forms of sales
promotion (for example national restrictions on resale at a loss—the
facts of Keck itself). In these cases the Court has simply assumed
that the proviso in paragraph 16 of Keck has been satisWed.
Advocate General Jacobs has been particularly vocal in his
criticism of this approach, arguing in Leclerc-Siplec that advertising
restrictions may pose a particularly serious threat to the integration
of the market (para. 37). As he pointed out, in a number of pre-Keck
cases which concerned restrictions on advertising (e.g. Cases C-1/90
and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior v. Departamento de
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Sanidad y Seguridad Social [1991] E.C.R. I-4151, Case C-362/88 GB-
INNO-BM [1990] E.C.R. I-667) and restrictions on sales promotions
(Case 382/87 Ministe`re Public v. Buet [1989] E.C.R. 1235 (door-to-
door selling), Case 286/81 Oosthoek [1982] E.C.R. 4575 (free gifts))
the Court found a hindrance to imports constituting a measure
having equivalent eVect and then applied the principles in Cassis.
This tends to suggest that such restrictions do not have an equal
burden in law and in fact, as required by the paragraph 16 Keck
proviso and as the Court thought in Hu¨nermund and Leclerc-Siplec,
and do impede access to the market.
While the Advocate General's observations fell on deaf ears in
Leclerc-Siplec, his eVorts were Wnally rewarded (to a limited extent at
least) in Joined Cases C-34–36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen v. De
Agostini [1997] E.C.R. I-3843. This case concerned a Swedish ban on
television advertising directed at children under twelve and a ban on
misleading commercials for skincare products. Having recognised
that, following Leclerc-Siplec, these restrictions constitute certain
selling arrangements, the Court then, for the Wrst time, speciWcally
addressed in detail the paragraph 16 proviso in Keck. It said that
while the Wrst condition was clearly fulWlled (the measure applies to
all traders operating within the national territory), the second
condition might not be. It said that ªit cannot be excluded that an
outright ban, applying in one Member State, of a type of promotion
for a product which is lawfully sold there might have a greater impact
on products from other Member Statesº (para. 42). It continued that
while the eYcacy of various types of promotion is a question of fact
to be determined by the national court, ªit is to be noted that in its
observations De Agostini stated that television advertising was the
only eVective form of sales promotion enabling it to penetrate the
Swedish market since it had no other advertising methods for
reaching children and their parentsº (para. 43). This is reminiscent
of the Court's observations in Oosthoek that ªto compel a producer
either to adopt advertising or sales promotion schemes which diVer
from one state to another or to discontinue a scheme which he
considers to be particularly eVective may constitute an obstacle to
importsº (para. 15). The Court continued in De Agostini that if such
an unequal burden in law or fact is found then the national restriction
is caught by Article 30 and the burden shifts to the Member State to
justify it under principles similar to those in Cassis.
Therefore, in De Agostini the Court took Keck as a starting point
and decided that the measure constituted a certain selling arrangement
and did not breach Article 30, unless (as the Court indicated in this
case) it was shown that the ban did not aVect in the same way, in
fact and in law, the marketing of national products and products
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from other Member States to which Cassis principles would apply
(para. 44, although compare the bizarre and apparently contradictory
wording in para. 47). However, in a case decided two weeks before
De Agostini concerning a sales promotion, Case C-368/95 Vereinigte
Familiapress Zeitungsverlag v. Bauer Verlag [1997] E.C.R. I-3689, the
Court took Cassis as its starting point. The case concerned an
Austrian law which prohibited publishers from including prize
competitions in their publications. This meant that a German
publisher was prevented from publishing in Austria a magazine
containing crossword puzzles for which the winners would receive
prizes. Athough the Austrian Government argued that, post-Keck, its
legislation was not caught by Article 30 since its law concerned a
sales promotion, the Court disagreed. It said that although the
relevant national legislation was directed against a method of sales
promotion, since it related to the actual content of the product (in so
far as the competitions formed an integral part of the magazine in
which they appeared) (para. 11), the national legislation did not
concern a certain selling arrangement. It continued: ªMoreover, since
it requires traders established in other Member States to alter the
contents of the periodical, the prohibition at issue impairs access of
the product concerned to the market of the Member State of
importation and consequently hinders free movement of goods. It
therefore constitutes in principle a measure having equivalent eVect
within the meaning of Article 30º (para. 12). The Court then turned
its attention to the justiWcation and proportionality of those
restrictions. Therefore, Familiapress was a production requirement
case to which Cassis principles applied.
De Agostini and Familiapress reveal the greyness of the area in
which restrictions on advertising and sales promotion fall. What is
striking is that whichever way the cat is skinned (with a Keck
knife or a Cassis knife) the result may well be the same: rules
that obstruct methods for penetrating a new market fall within
Article 30 but can be justiWed under Cassis principles. The
diVerence between the two approaches may lie in the question of
proof. If the measure is classiWed as a certain selling arrangement
then the presumption is that there is no hindrance of access to
the market and the trader will need to work hard to rebut this
presumption (De Agostini). If the measure is considered a
production requirement it is presumed that there is an impediment
to access to the market (Familiapress).
One Wnal point to note—in the context of Articles 59 and 60 the
Court has, in all cases to date, found that where a non-discriminatory
restriction on the freedom to provide services exists it nevertheless
ªdirectly aVects access to the market in services in the other Member
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Statesº (Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] E.C.R. I-1141,
para. 38). It therefore breaches Article 59 unless justiWed by
ªimperative requirements in the public interestº. In De Agostini the
Court also had to consider whether the restrictions on advertising
breached Article 59. With surprisingly little analysis the Court said
that Member States could take measures relating to television
advertising provided that the national court found them justiWed and
proportionate. This decision at least enabled the Court to reach more
or less the same conclusion in respect of the goods and services part
of the judgment without clearly articulating how.
Catherine Barnard
comity and antisuit injunctions
A fundamental tension underlies English law's approach to antisuit
injunctions. Justice may warrant protecting a defendant from
oppressive proceedings in a foreign forum by ordering the plaintiV to
desist. But such relief challenges a foreign court's right to police its
own process. How can the demands of justice and of comity be
reconciled? When should concern for the one give way to respect for
the other? Perhaps because antisuit relief reXects wider equitable
principles, the prevention of injustice has long been the overriding
imperative in such cases. But English courts are increasingly sensitive
to the charge of chauvinism and respect for comity has become a
real consideration in shaping their approach.
Suppose that an injunction is sought to prevent foreign
proceedings which defy an English jurisdiction agreement. The
discretion to refuse relief was once largely conWned to ensuring the
timeliness of the application. It has even been said that comity is
irrelevant in such cases (The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 87,
96). But that provocative view has recently been doubted (Toepfer
Intl. GmbH v. Socie´te´ Cargill France [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379). And
such injunctions may be granted less readily in future. Relief will now
be denied if the foreign court is the forum conveniens (Akai Pty. Ltd.
v. People's Insurance Co. Ltd. [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 90). This equates
such cases with those where the presence of a foreign jurisdiction
agreement justiWes a stay of English proceedings according to the
principles enunciated in The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 119, such
reciprocity of treatment dispelling concerns about comity.
Similar deference to comity underlies the approach of the House
of Lords in Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel [1998] 2 W.L.R. 686. The
plaintiVs had sued Airbus, a French corporation, in Texas, concerning
an aircraft accident in India. The Court of Appeal enjoined the
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plaintiVs from proceeding although Bangalore, not England, was
the natural forum (see [1997] C.L.J. 46). They entertained the
application because justice required that relief be granted, and
because the Texas plaintiVs were amenable to English jurisdiction in
personam, being English-domiciled. But the House of Lords disagreed,
declining jurisdiction. Comity requires that a court may intervene
only if it has a connection with, or an interest in, the dispute.
Normally (but not invariably) it should be the natural forum, as in
the leading case, Ae´rospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak [1987] A.C. 87.
Airbus thus dispels the hitherto widespread belief that jurisdiction
exists whenever justice compels that such relief be granted, provided
that the enjoined party is subject to the power of the court. But
Airbus is not perhaps the unequivocal endorsement of comity that it
appears to be. Indeed, the decision illustrates not so much the power
of the principle as the rather limited sense in which English courts
understand it. For Airbus stands for two propositions. A dispute
must be suYciently connected with England to justify relief. But
equally a court is immune from criticism if such a connection exists, for
if so, ªthere will be no infringement of comityº (per Lord GoV, p. 695).
But is the argument from comity answered merely because a court
is appropriately connected or interested? Airbus notwithstanding, the
English approach is open to more fundamental objections. One
concerns how relief is granted once jurisdiction is taken. Vexation or
oppression is required under Ae´rospatiale principles, but an applicant
may in practice succeed by demonstrating little more than the added
inconvenience and expense it would suVer by defending proceedings
abroad, as perhaps in Ae´rospatiale itself. Does that warrant such
intrusive relief ?
More importantly, it may be irrelevant to insist that a court
should be appropriately connected with the dispute. The real question
is not whether the English court is connected with the case, nor even
whether it is more connected than the foreign forum. It is whether
any court, whatever its interest, and whatever justice requires, is
entitled to determine the acceptability of proceedings elsewhere. The
Supreme Court of Canada squarely faced the issue in Amchem
Products Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Board (1993) 102 D.L.R. (4th)
96, also involving Texas proceedings. It held (in eVect) that relief
should be limited to situations where a foreign court has exercised an
exorbitant jurisdiction. The Texas court, complying with US
ªminimum contactº requirements, had not. This approach dramati-
cally curtails the power to enjoin proceedings, eVectively conWning it
to cases (surely exceptional) where a foreign court is wholly
unconnected with the dispute. Moreover, the absence of a doctrine of
forum non conveniens (which Texas then lacked) is not decisive.
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But, if Amchem exposes the core of the comity problem, its
implications were never explored in Airbus; tantalisingly, however,
Lord GoV considered the Canadian approach ªof considerable
interestº (p. 699). The question thus remains whether English law's
approach to antisuit injunctions is truly compatible with comity.
A future court may yet conWrm that it is, as Airbus suggests. But the
time may have come to heed the implicit message of Amchem and to
end the pretence that this is so. Unless we accept, uncomfortably,
that comity is irrelevant, this compels a more restrictive view of anti-
suit relief. What then does comity require? The Amchem approach is
problematic in practice (see [1997] 56 C.L.J. 46). But policy
may justify enjoining proceedings which defy English jurisdiction
agreements, at least in circumstances equivalent to those in which the
presence of a foreign jurisdiction agreement justiWes staying English
proceedings. A court should also be entitled to preserve the integrity
of its own process, as where a party who supplies evidence in English
proceedings is sued abroad in consequence (Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon
[1986] 3 W.L.R. 414). Again, as Amchem implies, it might be
permissible to prevent the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
foreign courts (Midland Bank plc v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1986] Q.B.
689). But, however the law might be reshaped in future, the challenge
is not to legitimise English law's existing approach, as Airbus implies,
but to examine whether it is legitimate at all.
Richard Fentiman
conditional fee agreements: the courts and parliament in
unison
The developments noted here show that conditional fee agreements
have become a signiWcant, perhaps even the dominant, means of
securing access to civil justice. The political popularity of such
agreements is not hard to explain. Since 1949, civil legal aid has
enabled the less well-oV to litigate in the ordinary courts. But it is
notorious that many people are excluded from justice, either because
they are deterred by the size of the potential contribution to a
legally-aided action or because their modest means disentitle them
altogether from that system. Furthermore, legal aid is perceived by
Treasury oYcials to be an excessive drain on the Wsc.
The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 introduced the
conditional fee agreement into English law, even though many Law
Lords spoke against this concept during the Parliamentary debates.
The scheme was implemented by secondary legislation in 1995, but
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at Wrst it applied only to certain classes of litigation. From 29 July
1998 (the Conditional Fees Order 1998, S.I. 1998/1860), conditional
fee agreements can apply to any type of court litigation, other than
certain family law matters mentioned at section 58(10) of the 1990
Act.
Such an agreement is deWned by section 58(1) of the 1990 Act as
one which concerns litigation services and provides for the client's
ªfees and expenses, or any part of them to be payable only in
speciWed circumstancesº. The agreement usually awards the lawyer a
success fee exceeding his ordinary charge. This ªupliftº can be as
great as 100 per cent of the normal fee (article 4 of the 1998 Order).
One view is that conditional fee agreements rival sliced bread in
their capacity to increase human happiness. Although the lawyer
risks zero or meagre payment in defeat, she is more likely to receive
a handsome prize when the client wins, a prize no longer vitiated as
champertous, according to section 58(3) of the 1990 Act, so long as
it does not exceed double payment for a single job. The client will
pay the lawyer only if he wins, although in defeat he will remain
liable for the opponent's costs, a risk against which most plaintiVs
can now insure. As for the opponent, the ªindemnityº costs principle
protects him if he wins, and if he loses the action section 58(8) of the
1990 Act makes clear that his costs liability does not extend to
paying the ªupliftº incurred by the other side under the conditional
arrangement. In practice, therefore, the ªupliftº is funded by any
damages or other money recovered in the action by the plaintiV.
In Thai Trading Co. (a Wrm) v. Taylor [1998] 2 W.L.R. 893,
Mrs. Taylor bought a bed from the plaintiV and paid for it in part.
The seller sued her for the balance. Mrs. Taylor counter-claimed to
recover her part-payment. Her husband, a solicitor, acted for her on
a ªno win, no feeº basis but, in the event of success, without any
charge beyond his normal fees. Costs were awarded in favour of
Mrs. Taylor, but the plaintiV argued that at common law a conditional
fee agreement is unlawful and, therefore, the plaintiV need not
indemnify her costs.
The Court of Appeal upheld Mrs. Taylor's costs claim and held
that at common law a solicitor can validly agree to act on the basis
that he is to be paid his ordinary costs if he wins but not if he loses.
The court rejected authority, notably Aratra Potato Co. Ltd. v. Taylor
Joynson Garrett [1995] 4 All E.R. 695, which had declared such an
agreement to be contrary to public policy. Millett L.J. was
unpersuaded that conditional fees are pernicious:
. . . it is in my judgment fanciful to suppose that a solicitor will
be tempted to compromise his professional integrity because he
will be unable to recover his ordinary proWt costs in a small case
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if the case is lost. Solicitors are accustomed to withstand far
greater incentives to impropriety than this.
But what of big cases? The courts can now only pray and exhort.
Thus in Hodgson v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [1998] 1 W.L.R. 1056,
1065, Lord Woolf M.R. emphasised that a statutory conditional fee
arrangement does not change the lawyer's foremost duty to the client
and the court to disregard his own Wnancial interest during litigation,
especially when advising the client about the merits of a settlement
or discontinuance of the claim.
In Bevan Ashford (a Wrm) v. GeoV Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd. (in
liquidation) [1998] 3 W.L.R. 172, Scott V.-C. considered the validity
of conditional fee agreements for the conduct of arbitration. Y, a
company in liquidation, wished to sue B. The solicitor's fee agreement
with Y, although conditional, did not provide for an ªupliftº and so
fell within the common law principle recently stated in the Thai case,
already noted. However, Y's barrister proposed acting on a
conditional basis, with an uplift of 50 per cent. in the event of
success. This went beyond the Thai decision. Y, therefore, sought a
declaration whether the barrister's fee agreement was valid.
His Lordship noted that in Re Trepca Mines Ltd. [1963] Ch. 199
it was said that the traditional policy objection to conditional legal
fees applies to arbitration no less than to court litigation. He held
that the statutory scheme for conditional fee arrangements introduced
by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 does not extend to
arbitration. But this was not decisive since notions of public policy
can change over time. To avoid an absurd discrepancy between court
litigation and arbitration, Scott V.-C. concluded:
. . . if a conditional fee agreement relating to a particular cause
of action is sanctioned for proceedings in court by [the statutory
scheme], the conditional fee agreement is free from any public
policy objection in relation to arbitration proceedings in
pursuance of that cause of action.
This and the Court of Appeal's decision in Thai are good examples
of the courts shaping the common law by analogy with legislative
principle, a technique which Beatson has advocated more generally
(see [1997] C.L.J. 291, 312). Time will surely reveal whether the
change of policy with regard to these fee agreements is sound.
N.H. Andrews
